

## Comments on the State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security

by

**Leo G. Michel**

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies,  
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

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***(The views expressed are the personal views of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect official views of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. Government agency.)***

First of all, I would like to thank GLOBE-EU, the Institute for Environmental Security and Worldwatch Institute for their invitation.

### **Role of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)**

I am not speaking today as a Robert Kagan, the author of that now famous—or infamous—formula that: "On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."

Despite having worked on national security issues for over 25 years in the U.S. government, mostly in the Pentagon, I don't feel particularly Martian.

I don't really like the terms of "hard" versus "soft" security; if around 3 million persons died in 2003 from HIV/AIDs, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa, as I read in the report, it's impossible to dismiss this as a "soft" security issue.

Having read Robert Cooper's book, [The Breaking of Nations](#), he does not strike me as an envoy from Venus.

Images can camouflage the facts.

I'd like to refer to my recently published article: ["NATO and the EU: Stop the minuet; it's time to tango."](#)

The title was chosen to make a basic point: despite having declared their strategic partnership two years ago, the NATO-EU relationship remains, in several respects, excessively formal and restrictive, whereas today's security environment requires a more flexible, cooperative approach.

Sample of reactions to the title:

- "If you were a good European, you would have listed the EU first..."
- "Monsieur Michel, your caricature of the minuet reveals an anti-French bias..."

(Ironic!)

- "The tango is the dance of macho males and fallen women, and you clearly believe NATO represents the former...Where does that leave the EU?"

Such reactions were offered in good humor, but they remind us that these institutions coexisted in Brussels for nearly 50 years with barely any contact between them—two institutions "in same city, on different planets."

It's been six years since the St. Malo declaration, where Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac agreed that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so..."

Today, ESDP is enshrined in the EU Treaty and pending EU Constitution; EU structures to formulate and implement a range of defense and security policies are up and running.

Focus on what's happening now and what's needed in the future in this NATO-EU partnership.

Key fact: as a result of their respective enlargements earlier this year, 19 of 25 EU members are also members of NATO, and 4 of the others belong to PFP.

Each of these countries has a single army, air force, or navy and a single defense budget to meet their NATO, EU, and national commitments.

None can afford wasteful duplication or divergent doctrines, standards, and operational practices that would increase the inherent risks of military actions, be they humanitarian operations, or peacekeeping, or combat missions.

Given the extent of overlapping membership, it should not surprise us that, at the strategic level, one detects more convergent views on security threats to the Euro-Atlantic community.

It would be strange if European states were schizophrenic, pursuing their security interests in one way through NATO and in a contradictory way through the EU.

The European Security Strategy of December 2003 lists five key threats to Europe as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime.

Except for crime, the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002 and NATO pronouncements—1999 Strategic Concept and more recent declarations/ministerial statements—list essentially the same threats.

The EU Strategy emphasizes non-military tools to prevent and diffuse crises but hardly strikes a pacifist stance.

To be fair, the U.S. Strategy and NATO pronouncements recognize that states must use all their tools, not just the military, to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century threats.

The Worldwatch report discussion of "roots of insecurity" mentioned, for example, that "weapons do not necessarily provide security", that "real security in a globalizing world cannot be provided on a purely national basis", and that "democratic governance...a vibrant civil society...and (other) non-military dimensions have an important influence on security and stability."

Similar themes dominate American political discourse these days, and in fact this is not exactly new.

I was part of a small group of Pentagon staffers who came to NATO with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz just two weeks after September 11.

He told Allied defense ministers: terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda would not be defeated only with cruise missiles or bombers. A multi-year effort would be required, using all the tools of government—diplomatic, intelligence, economic, financial, law enforcement and military. No single institution, including NATO, could coordinate all of these tools.

This is not to say that there is a perfect identity of views on security challenges or how to respond to them between the United States and Europe or, for that matter, among Europeans.

But the glass is more than half full.

Without minimizing the importance of non-military efforts (about confronting and defusing global threats), I agree with what Mr. Cooper wrote in his book, that is, "if Europe is serious, it needs to contribute more in the field of military muscle."

When it comes to military capabilities, the EU gradually has become more realistic about its ambitions and pragmatic in its procedures.

Its focus has shifted from the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal—i.e., to develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy up to 50,000-60,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain them for at least one year on missions ranging from humanitarian and rescue tasks to peacekeeping and separation of warring parties.

Clear to everyone that while the EU has met many of its quantitative goals in terms of troops, aircraft, and ships, it still lacks many of the key capabilities needed to deploy, engage, command, control, and sustain those forces in any demanding scenario.

More recently, the EU recently has emphasized the goal of creating, by 2007, thirteen rapidly deployable battle groups of around 1500 personnel, two of which are supposed to be able to undertake concurrent operations, normally under a UN mandate, lasting from one to four months.

The EU also has committed to making its battle group concept complementary to, and mutually reinforcing with, the Alliance's significantly more capable NATO Response Force.

Much must be done to improve EU capabilities, and these efforts will not be cost free, but the fundamental logic of close cooperation with NATO is now obvious.

Proof of ESDP's worth will rest with its performance on missions.

On balance, its record so far has been positive, although there have also been problematic areas regarding consultation with NATO.

Last December, NATO-EU cooperation began its most critical test to date, as NATO terminated its successful 9-year old SFOR mission and the EU deployed a new military mission, ALTHEA.

NATO is providing important support to ALTHEA under the NATO-EU "Berlin Plus" arrangements finalized in March 2003, but NATO also remains directly engaged with Bosnia through a moderately sized NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.

The EU might well face greater challenges in Bosnia that its leaders anticipated in mid-2002, when they first offered the idea of launching a follow-on mission to SFOR.

One reason is that since then, several European states have sent a significant number of their limited, deployable forces elsewhere—to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Cote d'Ivoire, for example.

Meanwhile, the situation in Kosovo remains unsettled.

At the same time, the U.S., NATO, and the EU are working together in new and promising ways to enhance stability and security.

EU experts teamed with NATO and the U.S. to support the Afghan presidential election last October, and President Bush praised EU assistance to the recent Iraqi elections.

The three played mutually supportive roles to advance democratic elections in Ukraine, and are laboring, in different ways, to steer Russia toward more responsible (and democratic) domestic and international policies.

All are engaged in encouraging reform and regional cooperation within the Caucasus and Broader Middle East.

This is not to suggest that NATO-EU relations are or will be problem free.

These are proud organizations that remain profoundly different in structure, scope, and procedures, despite their shared democratic values and security interests.

Thus, one should not expect the United States to adopt an essentially *laissez-faire* attitude toward ESDP.

But it would be wrong to mistake U.S. exhortations for European nations to do more for defense and to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation for some imagined U.S. hostility toward the whole ESDP concept.

Most Americans are not concerned that ESDP will do too much to enhance European military capabilities, but rather that it will achieve too little.

Moreover, the EU's holistic approach to improving justice, governance, and economic conditions in conflict regions--where it has expertise as well as Euros to contribute--complements U.S. and NATO strengths in invaluable ways.

In summing up my attitude toward the EU, I want to quote a renowned British citizen, Sting, lead singer of the Police.

If you listen closely to the hit song "Every breath you take", one hears the following lyrics:

"Every move you make  
*Every vow you break*  
*Every smile you fake*  
*Every claim you stake*  
*I'll be watching...EU."*

**Leo Michel**

Senior Research Fellow  
Institute for National Strategic Studies  
National Defense University  
Washington, D.C., USA