



Illegal trade in natural resources - Lessons learnt from the Kimberley Process

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Introduction: What is the KP?



- ➤ Certification scheme for rough diamonds trade-restrictive.
- >75 members (EU represents 27 MS)
- ➤ Members only trade with each other
- >UNGA and SC endorsement
- >WTO waiver applies



Why needed? Conflict diamonds



- ➤In 1990s, rough diamonds financed civil wars in Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone/Liberia
- >UN sanctions limited effect:
 - > need to control all diamonds
 - separate "good" from "bad"
- ➤ Mandate restrited to conflict? Definition of conflict?



Who? Representativity



- ➤ Tripartite:
 - NGOs
 - industry
 - governments
- ➤ Producers, traders and consumers involved
- ➤ Technical, legal, industry, trade, customs, geological expertise



How is the KP structured?



- ➤ No treaty
- No international organisation
- Rotating Chair/Secretariat
- 'Virtual' working groups
- >Intersessional/Plenary meetings
- >Strong stakeholder commitment



How does the KP work?



- ➤ The receipt: Transparency + trade controls
- + internal controls + administrative cooperation
- ➤ The verification: Monitoring system, statistical reconciliation



Success ...



- ➤ Conflict diamonds less than 0.2% world production but other factors also relevant
- > Deterrence effect
- > 'Incidental' benefits:
 - Increased transparency
 - Government revenues
 - Technical assistance/training



And challenges ...



- Limitations: administrative capacity, uneven commitment,
- ➤ Challenges: KP reform? (mandate, institutionalisation, budget, independent monitoring etc)



Lessons?



- ➤ Coalition of interests
- ➤ Pragmatic/flexible approach
- ➤ Mandate creep?
- ➤ Tripartite structure
- ➤ Peer review / monitoring and verification capacity
- ➤ Tailored response to specific issue in particular industry