

Seminars on research in accounting

Master class 1.

Part 1. Why to disclose information in the first place?

Theoretical models of information disclosure and verification, market reaction to disclosure, motives to withhold information. *Akerlof 1970, Spence 1973, Verrecchia 1983, Jung and Kwon 1988.*

Empirical studies. *Heinle, Samuels, Taylor 2020, Kim, Taylor, Verrecchia 2021, Heinle, Kim, Taylor, Zhou 2020.*

Part 2-1. What if information is imprecise?

Structural models of earnings management. Accrual and real earnings management, fraud and its detection. *Dechow et al, 2010, Beyer et al, 2018, Luneva, 2021, Zakolyukina, 2018, Terry, Whited, Zakolyukina, 2021.*

Master class 2.

Part 2-2. What if information is imprecise? (part 2)

Part 3. How to use information for managerial compensation?

Theoretical models of contracts, attributes of information used in contracts, contracts for multidimensional actions of an agent. *Jensen, Meckling, 1976, Holmstrom, 1979, Banker, Datar, 1989, Feltham, Xie, 1994.*

Empirical studies. How do CEO compensation structures look like? Why do they get so much? *Core, Guay 1999, Conyon, Core, Guay, 2011.*

Master class 3.

Part 4. Only financial information...?

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and disclosure of CSR information. Investors' preferences towards ESG.

Theoretical studies. *Pastor, Stambaugh, Taylor 2021, Friedman, Heinle, Luneva, 2021.*

Empirical studies. *Martin, Moser, 2016, Sautner, Lev, Vilkov, Zhang 2020, Lu, 2020, Dai, Liang, Ng, 2020.*

Part 5. What else is there to discuss...

A brief review of other topics in accounting.

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