

論 說

Human Behavior and the Concept of Appropriateness

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In this article I intend to point out some of the difficulties and dilemmas encountered when one attempts to discuss the concept of the appropriateness of human behavior in intellectual frameworks which are either directly or indirectly derived from the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, or in intellectual frameworks which run roughly parallel to this distinction. In order to show how some of these difficulties can be avoided I will also present a preliminary taxonomy of contexts, based on categories developed by Stephen Toulmin, in which the term "appropriateness" can be feasibly used.

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What for Descartes seemed a relatively simple matter of distinguishing between the ontological status of "mind" on the one hand, and the ontological status of "body" on the other, has subsequently been the reason for much philosophical vexation. How are the two related and how do they interact? Descartes himself naively believed that mind and body "touch" or interact in the pineal gland. Some of Descartes' followers, holding that any interaction between mind and body is logically precluded if both are defined as being distinct metaphysical substances, set forth the view that mind and body can only be described as running parallel with one another. Since no compelling solution to the problem has yet been presented, some may be led to think that perhaps the problem lies not in how to reunite the two in a metaphysical marriage of heaven and hell, but rather in deciding which of the two ontological statuses one will accept as ultimate. Redefining the problem in this way runs the risk of caricature, however, for few would be willing to

accept *in toto* the necessary ramifications of a decision in favor of either view: solipsism on the one hand and pure mechanism on the other.

However, what began for Descartes as an ontological distinction has historically transformed itself into a debate between those who take as their working hypothesis the notion that all mental functions can be ultimately reduced to bodily functions and those who wish to maintain a separate sphere for certain “higher” mental functions apart from those functions which can be described in purely physical terms or as “bodily.” And now the debate seems to have further transformed itself into a philosophical dilemma, especially for those interested in formulating a descriptive analysis of human behavior. Two opposing questions can be asked: Can (or should) human behavior be described in terms of a certain mental function (or functions) which precede and in some sense “cause” a person’s action? Or should we attempt to describe human behavior purely in terms of physiological functions, set in motion by some external stimuli, which just happen to have their source in the brain?

Lurking behind these questions is the old and familiar philosophical problem of free will and determinism. Descartes was content to say in effect, that mind, being substantively different from body, is also immune from the “laws” which govern the latter, and hence is infinitely free. Directly opposed to this view would be a position which, by refusing to allow for an ontological distinction between mind and body and by delegating all that we call “mental functions” to the physiological functions of the brain, would hold that it is *precisely because* all mental functions can be reduced to physiological functions that they are subject to certain physical laws which can be discerned and described. A person, therefore, would have no choice in deciding how he will act (no “free will”) because all of his actions are governed by these laws. Again, in setting up the problem in this way, we run the risk of caricature, because most philosophers who have tried to deal with the problem have sought to steer a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. Yet, although the variations on the central theme have been

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within the same Cartesian framework.¹⁾

Taking either of the above positions (which have admittedly been presented in their most "radical" forms), is it possible for one to talk about certain human actions and behavior as being "appropriate"?

If we start from Descartes' viewpoint that the mind is infinitely free, certainly no account of how one might distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate behavior can be given. The implication must be drawn that since the mind is free, it is free to choose whatever course of action it deems fit. Human behavior, therefore, is totally arbitrary. There are no norms outside of those which the mind sets for itself by which the appropriateness of human behavior can be judged. Yet, even if we say that *in principle* this might be the case, *experientially* human behavior does not seem to always act in a purely arbitrary or capricious manner.

In the first place, we note that one often feels compelled to give reasons for one's behavior, i.e., to name some of the factors which have been taken into consideration when deciding upon a course of action. Take, for example, the statement: "I ran because he threatened to attack me." The simple act of running might be occasioned by many different motives. One *might* run because he has been threatened, but one *might also* run simply because he wants to get some exercise. In the former case, it is possible to discern a direct relationship—a relationship we might even be tempted to call "causal"—between the act of being threatened and the act of running.

In the second place, we are unable to account for any reason why the word "appropriateness" has become a part of our vocabulary. Many, if not all, of the uses of the term refer to some relationship between an action and some norm or set of norms by which the action can be judged. Either the behavior conforms to the norm or it does not, and this distinction provides the basis by which actions can be judged in terms of their appropriateness.

1) John Locke, for example, although he made a similar distinction between the ontological statuses of mind and body, held that voluntary actions are caused by forces within the mind. Thus human freedom is preserved, even though one may simultaneously maintain that human behavior is in some sense determined.

Descartes, of course, attempted to steer himself around this objection by introducing another variable into the discussion. Although the will can indeed choose between alternative courses of action, if the choice is made with respect to one's understanding of the effectiveness of the act in dealing with the situation and with respect to the act's consequences, the better—or may we reintroduce the term?—the more *appropriate*, course of action might be capable of being discerned. Following the Socratic dictum that whoever knows the good will do it, the understanding can inform the will as to the more appropriate course of action. An assumption is made here, however, which need not necessarily be made—namely, that the will always acts in accordance with one's conception of what the good is. Even if we deny that some people might exercise their freedom of choice to deliberately choose the bad or the evil or the good, we are still left with the problem of attempting to describe how one comes to know what the good is. It would seem impossible to describe the good in terms other than those which would point to the organism's dealing with external circumstances. And in doing so, we would need to point out that these external circumstances do in fact both influence one's decisions and limit the possibilities for action. To take the consequences of Descartes' notion in their strictest sense, one might just as well sing the “Star Spangled Banner” (as opposed to running) when threatened by attack.

If, on the other hand, we take up the position opposite to Descartes' which sees all “mental functions” as being reducible to certain physical laws, we encounter many of the same problems. The implication here is that if actions are merely the product of the external laws which govern those actions, then one cannot choose between alternatives because the laws themselves will always operate in the same way. Given situation A, the response will always be behavior B. No variances would be permitted, nor could such variances even be logically possible. If one has no choice in the matter, then how can one talk about the appropriateness of any given action or behavior? Again, we are left with the problem of how to account for why the word “appropriateness” has become a part of our vocabulary. We also have the problem of attempting to square this position with instances in which we clearly

feel as if we are actually making a choice between viable alternatives.

Closely related to these issues and perhaps running in direct parallel with them is another conflict which seems to stem from the same Cartesian dichotomy. The conflict arises in attempting to show how the appropriateness of an action might be judged. Who shall decide whether or not a particular action is appropriate and/or on what basis can such a decision be made? As suggested earlier, it would seem that any attempt to assess the appropriateness of an action must appeal to some norm or set of norms by which the act can be judged. Again, to formulate the dilemma along Cartesian lines, the central issue seems to be whether or not these norms transcend, or are in some way exterior to, the individual, or whether it is ultimately left up to the individual to formulate his own norms (interiorly, out of his "own head," so to speak) by which he can act accordingly.

Part of the problem seems to lie in a tendency to want to equate "exteriority" with "objectivity" on the one hand, and "interiority" with "subjectivity" on the other. In assessing the appropriateness of a given action, appeal is often made to judgments regarding whether or not the action conforms to some public, "exterior" norm, accessible to all, or merely to some private, "interior" norm, which is the property of the individual alone. Thus we might hear someone say, "He was acting merely on feelings," implying that the individual in question was *not* acting in accordance with some publicly recognizable standard or norm (and perhaps that he should have), but rather in accordance with some private standard or norm.

But in what contexts might we feasibly say that one who is said to have "acted on feelings" is actually acting in accordance with such a private standard or norm? If the person in question were to explain his action by saying, "I don't care how other people feel about it; I have my own feelings on the matter, and I simply followed them," then such a characterization might be feasible. In this instance, to say that the person "acted on feelings" can be taken to mean that he acted according to certain principles he himself believed in—principles which may have differed greatly from those held by most of his peers. In explaining why he went to the movies on a certain night, another person might reply, "I just felt like it." Or another

might explain why he went outside by saying, "I felt like getting some fresh air." In these cases, however, it would not seem to make sense to raise the question as to whether or not either person acted in accordance with any private standards or norms.

This analysis of "feelings" is intended to show that using feelings (or other "inner" criteria) as a means of assessing the appropriateness of any given action will not hold for all that can be meant when one says, "He was merely acting on feelings." In the same way, to say that the appropriateness of certain actions can always be judged in terms of the degree to which they are in accordance with some exterior, public, and objective set of standards or norms, does not take into account those instances in which we can legitimately say that a certain action is appropriate or inappropriate without such an appeal. Here we only need think of those actions which by the simple virtue of being original, different, and outside any established norms which might have been set, are applauded for their "appropriateness." The board member who openly criticizes the policies of the chairman may break all the rules of "appropriateness" in business etiquette. Yet, even though his fellow board members may agree that his action was "out of line," i.e., inappropriate by the norms of business etiquette, they may still applaud him for "standing up" to the chairman—especially if his plans and proposals seem better for the company than those of the chairman.

Either mode of attempting to assess the appropriateness of any given action seems to have difficulty in accounting for the rich diversity of contexts in which one might say, "His action was appropriate (or inappropriate)." Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the various ways in which philosophers have sought to discuss the problem in terms which draw from both sides of the dilemma or which deal with the two modes in various combinations. Perhaps the chief problem, however, lies in the attempt to reduce the discussion of the appropriateness of actions to only two contexts (whether regarded separately or in combination), instead of attempting to expand the number of basic categories to include a broader range of contexts. In the next section, I shall attempt to do this by focusing particular attention on some ways in which various "norms" can be applied

to human behavior. I shall also attempt to show that our actual use of norms cuts across some of the divisions or dichotomies which have been presented thus far.

2

In dealing with some of the dilemmas springing from the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body in the previous sections, many of our reasons for concern may be more imagined than real. No modern thinker, it might be argued, would hold to either of the two positions in the "radical" forms in which they have been presented. Yet, the basic issues, even when refined and presented in more sophisticated forms, still pose problems for one attempting to account for the nature of human behavior—and with regard to our purposes here—for the ways in which behavior can be judged as being either appropriate or inappropriate.

Stephen Toulmin has noted that in the modern scene the debate has gained new force in arguments as to whether or not all that we have previously called "mental functions" can be shown to be ultimately reducible to "physiological functions."²) Much of the debate seems to center on whether or not one can sharply differentiate between "person-talk" and "thing-talk," taking the concepts of *rules and roles* as offering suitable explanations (or a suitable set of explanations) for the former, and the concept of *laws* (scientific laws, "Laws of Nature") as offering suitable explanations for the latter. In other words, for purposes of explanation, should the individual be thought of as a *person* whose behavior can be explained in terms of rules, or should he be thought of primarily as a *thing* whose behavior can be explained in terms of physiological laws alone? The basic disagreement, as Toulmin characterizes it in his article "Rules and their Relevance for Understanding Human Behavior," is ". . . between those philosophers and psychologists who regard *behavioral rules* as sub-species of *natural laws*, and

2) Cf. Stephen Toulmin's article "The Mentality of Man's Brain," written for the Loyola University Centennial Symposium on The Brain and Human Behavior, October, 1969, pp. 1-4.

those who do not. . . .”³⁾ And, he notes, “The debate about *rationality* (rules/rule-conformity) and *causality* (laws/law-governedness) is too often pursued in a way that fails to allow for the complexity and diversity of the points at issue. . . .”⁴⁾

In attempting to do justice to the “complexity and diversity of the points at issue,” Toulmin proposes that human behavior cannot be adequately explained by separating our explanations into those characterized by “rules” and those characterized by “laws” to the point where one feels compelled to decide between one mode of explanation or the other, or to the point where one must think that such “rules” or “laws” can be applied to every situation and context. Although Toulmin thinks it is still possible for one to continue using the concept of “rules”—though in a modified way which absorbs the previous distinctions between “rules” and “laws”—he suggests that it is also possible for us to expand the number of individual cases and situations they are capable of covering. We must admit, he argues, of not just two modes of explanation, but rather of at least seven or eight.⁵⁾ These alternative modes can adequately cover all those instances in which we might want to speak of human behavior in terms of “rules” or “laws” (in the sense that these terms were used previously), yet at the same time do justice to several types of behavior which seem to fall somewhere in between. Toulmin’s taxonomy can perhaps help to shed some light on some of the contexts in which one might (and might not) be able to speak of various types of behavior in terms of their appropriateness or inappropriateness.

1. *Caused reactions.* At one end of the spectrum are those instances of human conduct in which “human rationality” plays the least part—conduct which might be most readily described under the old dichotomy in terms of “laws.” Such conduct can be discussed in terms of occurring *as a rule*. A

3) Stephen Toulmin, “Rules and their Relevance for Understanding Human Behavior,” in *Understanding Other Persons*, ed. T. Mischel (Blackwell, 1971), p. 187.

4) *Ibid.*

5) “Rules and their Relevance for Understanding Human Behavior” lists seven, but Toulmin later proposed an eighth, which is incorporated into the present discussion.

person with a weak stomach who overeats at a party will "as a rule" suffer from indigestion. There is a direct causal relationship between the act of overeating and the indigestion which results from this act. Naturally, the person did not have to overeat in the first place, and we might say that, knowing he had a weak stomach, it was *inappropriate* for him to eat too much. But the fact that his overeating resulted in indigestion is something that he himself could not help and could have no control over. In this context it would not make sense to judge his indigestion as being either appropriate or inappropriate. Such situations can be properly described in more or less causal terms, which indeed do not need to be characterized in terms of their appropriateness.

2. *Occasioned actions.* Occasioned actions may be described as actions in which an awareness of a particular situation calls for a particular response—a response which could be characterized by its *regularity*. A student, noting that today is a day on which classes meet, will endeavor to make it to his classes. When asked, he may be able to give a variety of reasons as to why he attends class regularly: he hopes to learn something; it is expected of him; or (perhaps less nobly) he enjoys seeing his friends, etc. But he also might simply answer, "I *always* go to classes on class days," and the other reasons may or may not come to mind. Indeed, he might never have thought of these other reasons at all had he not been asked, or it is even possible that he didn't have any well-thought-out reasons for attending classes regularly in the first place. It might be possible to discuss the appropriateness of his going to class by appealing to his reasons for going to class, and this appropriateness might be discussed in terms of a conditional statement: "If I hope to learn something, *then* I should go to class." The consequent is, of course, dependent upon the antecedent, and should the antecedent change to, say, "If I am not particularly interested in learning anything," then the consequent might also be changed to, "then it doesn't really matter if I go to class or not." In other words, given the conditional nature of the statement (given certain reasons, then certain actions should follow), we could not say in all cases, "It is appropriate to go to class." There might, of course, be some external rule by which the appropriateness of go-

ing to class could be judged, as would be the case if the professor had said, “Students must attend all class sessions.” Then, the appropriateness of the behavior of the student could be judged in terms of whether or not the student fulfilled this obligation. But in the case where the student merely sees that today is a class day and where this provides the occasion for his going to class, such uses of the word “appropriateness” would not be applicable. If the word “appropriateness” could be used at all, it would have to be in connection with what the student perceived in the situation which made the action appropriate. It is a class day, therefore it is appropriate for the student to go to classes; if it was not a class day, then it would not be appropriate for him to go to classes.

3. *Habitual behavior.* Habitual behavior may be described as behavior which a person engages in unknowingly without having a conscious sense of obligation to conform to a particular norm. Such behavior may be characterized as being *rule-governed*. A person who always gravitates towards the left side of the bed, rather than towards the right when going to sleep, may do so unknowingly, and may not even realize that his behavior has consistently fallen into this pattern until someone points it out to him. In this sense, his “habit” of gravitating towards the left side of the bed surely cannot be called either appropriate or inappropriate. After someone has pointed the habit out to him, he might try sleeping on the right side of the bed, and it may turn out that he has difficulty in going to sleep and is uncomfortable the whole night long. Since he obviously wouldn’t want to miss too much sleep, it might be said that it is indeed better for him to sleep on the left side of the bed—in fact, it might even be legitimately said that it is more *appropriate* for him to sleep on the left side of the bed. But the habit itself does not admit of being judged as either appropriate or inappropriate. He might just as well have acquired the habit of sleeping on the right side of the bed.

Habits of pronunciation may follow much the same lines. A person may unknowingly always pronounce the t’s in such words as *latter*, *butter*, and *waiter* as d’s. If he comes from a region in which pronouncing t’s in such a way is fairly common, and if others around him have no difficulty in un-

derstanding him, then the question of the appropriateness of his pronunciation habits cannot arise—or perhaps better—there would be no *reason* for the question of appropriateness to arise. An English teacher might point out that he is mispronouncing his t's and that it would really be more proper (i.e., *appropriate*) for him to stop pronouncing them as d's. In this case, the teacher would be appealing to what are in fact standard rules of pronunciation, and the appropriateness (in this case perhaps it would be better to say the "correctness") of the individual's pronunciation could be judged accordingly. But as long as the person is able to make himself understood, the question of appropriateness need not arise at all. Of course, there may be specific instances in which the individual is more likely to be misunderstood, and then perhaps he will have to call to mind some of the standard rules of pronunciation. The person might say, for example, "I had to choose between going up the ladder and or going up the stairs, and I chose the latter." If this person pronounced the t's of *latter* as d's, he would be misunderstood, in which case it would definitely be more appropriate for the individual to carefully enunciate the t's. We are jumping ahead of ourselves, however, and will discuss behavior in which it is necessary for one to consciously act in accordance with a specific rule, say a rule of pronunciation, in section 5 below. In this section, we are only concerned with unconscious, habitual behavior.

Before moving on, however, it is necessary for us to distinguish between some other types of behavior which might be called "habits," but which cannot be defined as behavior which a person engages in unknowingly without having a conscious sense of obligation to conform to a particular norm. We might say, for example, "He has a bad habit of biting his nails," or "Smoking is a bad habit." A person who has the habit of biting his nails in public may know that the behavior is unbecoming and indeed inappropriate, even though this awareness may not always come to mind every time he bites his nails. A person who knows that smoking may cause lung cancer, may not call this to mind every time he smokes—indeed he may deliberately try to forget that fact. In either case, however, there are external rules—"Biting one's nails is unbecoming" or "Smoking may cause lung

cancer”—which might be invoked to say that the behavior is inappropriate.

4. *Required conduct.* It has been necessary, in discussing the three ways of characterizing behavior which have been presented thus far, to carefully separate out those uses of the term “appropriateness” which may or may not be directly applicable to the behavior in question, from those uses of the term “appropriateness” which are applicable to various circumstances surrounding the behavior, but not to the behavior in question itself. Thus, in case 1 we saw that we might discuss the inappropriateness of eating too much when one has a weak stomach, but that it would not make sense to characterize the resulting indigestion either in terms of its appropriateness or inappropriateness. In case 2 we saw that reasons might be found for us to judge the appropriateness of going to classes, but that lacking such reasons the appropriateness of the behavior obviously could not be judged in terms of them. In case 3 we distinguished between several different uses of the word “habit,” concentrating on those uses of the word which are confined to types of behavior which cannot be judged in terms of their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Our conclusions thus far have been that, regarding the types of behavior (as we have defined them), only the types of behavior discussed in case 2 can be characterized in terms of their appropriateness, and here only in a very special sense of the term, namely, to describe those types of behavior which are called forth by some particular occasion.

In discussing required conduct, however, we finally come to a clear-cut case in which specific behaviors can be directly characterized in terms of their appropriateness or inappropriateness. Such behavior might be discussed as being *rule-conforming*. Here, we can talk about specific rules which are generally and publicly known and which require behaviors of certain sorts. Take, for example, the case of a man who talks with his mouth full at the dinner table. Even though Emily Post might devote a paragraph in one of her books to the subject of the “inappropriateness” of talking with one’s mouth full, it would still be a generally held rule that it is indeed indeed inappropriate for one to do this; the rule may or may not be formally stated. As long as the rule remains operative, however, the appropriateness of the behavior can be directly judged in terms of it. The following syllo-

gism may be presented:

It is inappropriate for one to talk with his mouth full.	(the rule)
Harry is talking with his mouth full.	(the behavior)
Therefore, Harry's behavior is inappropriate.	(judging the appropriateness of the behavior)

Harry might say, of course, "I don't really care about whether or not it's inappropriate for me to talk with my mouth full; the rule might apply to some people but not to me!" But wishing the rule away will not make the rule go away, unless, of course, people generally come to agree with Harry's point of view regarding the rule.⁶⁾ Yet, should the rule persist, it is also possible, of course, that there might be cases in which the rule might be temporarily suspended for some particular reason; in some special cases too it might be judged *more* appropriate for one to break the rule.⁷⁾

5. *Correct conduct.* To label our fifth case "correct conduct" seems to beg the question (of appropriateness). What we have in mind here are those types of behavior which can be characterized as being *rule-structured*. Using language offers one example; playing a game offers another. In both cases the activity involved is structured by rules.

In language there are rules of spelling, grammar, pronunciation, etc., which must be followed if one is to communicate clearly and effectively. There are many ways in which one might construct a sentence—for example, by putting a dependent clause before an independent clause, or vice versa. But whatever variations are permitted, are permitted within the boundaries of certain rules. The rules, of course, will vary from language to language,

6) The rules are, of course, culture-specific. Slurping noodle soup is bad manners in the United States, but acceptable manners in Japan.

7) In a war movie, the name of which I've forgotten, a messenger who needs to get a message to a certain town by a certain time stops off at a fellow countryman's house just long enough to get something to eat, relating the enemy's movements to his host in sentences that are punctuated with chewing on large mouthfuls of bread.

and even among dialects.⁸⁾

The line between variations and outright deviations in using language is not always easy to draw. (Here again we confront the question of appropriateness.) Toulmin seems to draw the line quite sharply, however, when he writes, “. . . the conformity or non-conformity of our utterances to linguistic rules is an all-or-nothing, right-or-wrong affair.”⁹⁾ Yet, we must ask: Do linguistic rules dictate *all* the appropriate uses of language, or might the rules be broken for very specific reasons, or might not language be bent, corrupted, or expanded to serve one’s own purposes, as, for example, James Joyce does so masterfully in *Finnegan’s Wake*?

Naturally, the correct uses of language must be learned and mastered first, and we must distinguish between those incorrect uses of language which arise out of ignorance and those which arise out of a conscious, informed attempt to “go beyond the limits of language.” Again, however, we are jumping ahead, because to “incorrectly” use language in the sense that Joyce does, requires the development of behavior which is capable of *rule-testing* (see section 8 below).

The variations or varieties of rule-structured behavior which might be permitted within the boundaries of such rules—and therefore in yet another sense of the term, may be called “appropriate”—can be further illustrated in the game of football. Certain rules of the game permit little or no vari-

8) Thus, a person speaking Low German might say, “*Ick kann nich zwimmen,*” while a person speaking High German might say, “*Ich kann nicht schwimmen.*” Simply because we call one *High* German and one *Low* German does not mean that one form of pronunciation is more appropriate than the other.

9) Toulmin, “Rules and their Relevance,” *op. cit.*, p. 193. In all fairness, this statement should be prefaced by some of Toulmin’s comments on pp. 192–3 of the same article: “. . . the performance within a given culture of some standard sequence of behavior can accordingly be judged ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ in either of two respects. It may be normal or eccentric, conformist or unconventional; and so (perhaps) open to criticism as a solecism, i.e. as falling outside the accepted range of requirement in some significant respect. Alternatively, it may be either good English or ungrammatical, clear or unintelligible, lucid or misunderstood; and so open to criticism for failing to conform to the systematic rules of syntax, phonology, and/or logical grammar.”

ance of behavior at certain times and in certain circumstances. The offensive backfield, for example, is not permitted to move (quite literally) before the ball is hiked. If a player moves, the team is penalized according to the rule which prohibits a team from having its backfield in motion. On the other hand, once the ball has been snapped, the backfield is permitted to move to any position on the field they choose. If a fullback, for example, received a hand-off from the quarterback, he is permitted to run down the field on either side he chooses with the sole provision that he not step beyond the sidelines. Thus, movements A, B, C, D . . . *ad infinitum* (where such movements take place within the boundaries of the playing field) would be permitted, but movement Z (stepping beyond the sidelines) is not permitted. In one sense, we might say that all movements save Z (and certain others) are appropriate moves in that they do not break the rules of the game. Here, however, we are beginning to stretch the meaning of "appropriate" to the point where it might be better to say that the movements are "permitted" by the rules, rather than "appropriate" with reference to them. Yet, in another sense, we still might say that certain of the player's movements are inappropriate—as would be the case if the player ran towards the opposite goal or deliberately ran into a pack of his opponents instead of trying to avoid them, even though both actions would be permitted by the rules. In this sense, out of all possible movements, there could be certain selected ones which could in fact be termed inappropriate.

6. & 7. *Instrumental procedures and internalized thoughts.* Instrumental procedures and internalized thoughts (or thinking) can be characterized in terms of being *rule-applying* and *rule-following* respectively. In working an algebra problem for example, we apply certain rules in attempting to solve it. When first learning to solve such problems, the rules must be used both correctly and in their proper sequence. When we have become sufficiently familiar with the correct ways in which this is done, we may be able to solve the problem without having to go through all the steps. We may be able to do the problem "in our heads," so to speak. All the rules may not be directly applied, even though they are still in some sense followed. We may also be able to do this in varying degrees. But regardless of whether or not

our thinking takes place “on paper” or “in our heads,” our chief goal is simply to solve the problem. Whatever behavior we engage in to solve the problem, which in the end results in a solution, could be termed appropriate behavior. Guessing, of course, would not count. We may be able to guess the correct answer, but we would have neither applied nor followed any specific rules in order to arrive at our answer. An intermediate case might be one in which we had some intuitive insight (an “I-almost-know-how-to-solve-the-problem” insight) as to what the answer might be, but were unable to thereby judge for ourselves whether or not we had correctly solved the problem.

There are, of course, some instances in which we might make mistakes along the way which turn out to be to our advantage rather than disadvantage. (This could hardly happen when we are attempting to solve an algebra problem.) In one case we might miscalculate how long a certain board needs to be in order to make a shelf. It may turn out that our miscalculation ends up giving us a board of exactly the right size. A case of a completely different kind might be one in which we fail to follow exactly grandma’s recipe for pumpkin pie, but turn out making a pumpkin pie even better than grandma’s.

In all of these cases, however, the appropriateness of the behavior in question can be judged in terms of the end-results the behavior produces and the dexterity with which we are able to use the relevant rules to produce those results.

8. *Conscious criticism.* In discussing conscious criticism we again come to a point where it is very difficult—if not impossible—to speak of the appropriateness of behavior. For here we are at the other end of the spectrum of those activities in which, on the Cartesian models, we may be said to be most fully aware of freedom of thought or choice.

In conscious criticism we engage in the activity of *rule-testing*; in Toulmin’s words, the “. . . rules themselves have now become the *objects of our intellectual activity*, and not merely *elements in its production*.”¹⁰⁾ Here, of

10) Toulmin, “Rules and their Relevance,” *op. cit.*, p. 195.

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course, there can be no further rules to guide us in determining which rules we will continue to use, which we will ignore or dispose of, or which we will attempt to refine and improve upon. We may decide to throw away grandma's recipe for pumpkin pie and try to invent a new recipe on our own. We may try to write another *Finnegan's Wake*. And since there are no further rules to guide us in these activities, neither are there any norms or standards by which the appropriateness or inappropriateness of rule-testing can be judged.

In the second part of this article I have used the eight ways proposed by Toulmin in which rules can be adopted to account for behavior as an occasion for discussing some of the varied ways in which the appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain types of behavior may be assessed. The treatment in no way presumes to be exhaustive, but it has illustrated, I hope, that the dichotomies pointed out in the first part do not provide a broad enough framework in which questions of appropriateness can be discussed. Naturally, the meanings of the word "appropriateness" can be as varied as are the uses to which the word is put, and the contexts in which the word is employed. By confining ourselves to a limited number of uses and contexts, some of those meanings could be explicated.

One limitation of this article has been that all the types of behavior discussed have been ones which might be expected, in most cases, from normal adults only. A number of qualifications would have been introduced were we to extend the discussion to include children and developmentally disabled individuals. Also missing is a greater concern for a sense of development, in which simpler behavioral patterns, when mastered, can be seen as becoming the building blocks for behavioral patterns of increasing complexity. This could also greatly help us know the qualifications which would have to be made in order to include children and developmentally disabled individuals in any discussion of "appropriateness." Finally, the article has for the most part discussed the question of appropriate behavior from the theoretic viewpoint of a particular culture, that is, any given culture taken in isolation. A discussion of cross-cultural notions of appropriateness, as well as of competing notions which coexist within the same culture, might produce an even

more complex set of categories. These considerations only bolster the argument, however, that the question of appropriateness cannot be adequately discussed within the confines of Cartesian (or any other) dualism.

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